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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Westchester's statement of facts states that "[Zimmerman] was not listed as 
president on corporate documents from 1992 until Paria filed its reinstatement 
application with the Division of Corporations in November of 1996, after he signed the 
lease with Westchester." That statement is false. Minutes of the meeting of the board 
of directors clearly indicate that he was elected president on April 14, 1995. Exhibit 
88 and Tr. I at 157. Minutes of directors' meetings presumably qualify as corporate 
documents. 
POINT I: THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR PIERCING THE 
CORPORATE VEIL. 
Westchester states that Zimmerman has failed to marshal the evidence and 
asserts that there is ample evidence to support each prong of the alter-ego test. 
Westchester goes on to state that there is no evidence the corporation did certain things 
and recites several of the findings of fact. Westchester is the party seeking to pierce 
the corporate veil and has the burden of proof. The fact that there is no evidence is not 
Zimmerman's problem and findings of fact are not evidence. 
Neither prong of the two prong test cited by Westchester and set forth in Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. James Contractors. Inc.. 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1998) has 
been met. There is no sufficient evidence to show a unity of interest and ownership. 
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The shareholders of Paria Group are Jane Haynie and Zimmerman's wife. Even if the 
court could find, without any evidence being offered, that Zimmerman controlled his 
wife's shares, there is no evidence as to how many shares she owned. No question was 
ever asked to determine who owned how much of the corporation. Instead of offering 
evidence as to who owned the corporation, Westchester cites 1990 records that show 
Zimmerman and his wife are two of five shareholders. From that counsel concludes 
that Zimmerman and his wife "are the principal shareholders". Brief at 8. This is not 
evidence which can sustain the judgment. The burden of proof for piercing the 
corporate veil was on Westchester, yet they offered no evidence that Zimmermans were 
any more than nominal shareholders. For all we know from the record, Haynie, 
Haynie, and Walker, the other shareholders, may have owned 99% of the stock. 
Presumably, Westchester offered no evidence because supposition served better than 
the facts. Nor does Westchester cite any evidence that observance of the corporate 
form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable result would follow. 
All we have is counsel's speculation. 
The same is true of most of the eight factors set forth in Colman v. Colman. 743 
P.2d 782,786 (Utah App. 1987). Paria Group is not a one man corporation and it had 
at least $600,000.00 in assets. It could not be said to be undercapitalized. 
No evidence was offered that Paria operated without observing corporate 
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formalities. Westchester's brief refers to the incomplete minutes. This is the same 
evidence relied upon for factor six, absence of corporate records. While it is true that 
there is evidence of the minutes being incomplete, there is no evidence that the 
meetings weren't held. Counsel's speculation is not evidence. 
The evidence did establish that no dividends had been paid to shareholders. 
No evidence was offered that the dominant shareholder or any other person or 
entity siphoned corporate funds. Likewise there is no evidence that there was a 
dominant shareholder. 
No evidence was offered of the nonfunctioning of other officers or directors. 
There were minutes of several directors' meetings and no exploration of whether there 
had been other meetings. Exhibit 88. Earlene Biggs testified as to her duties as vice 
president. Tr. I at 23. Scott Schumway testified to his functioning as a vice prsident. 
Tr. Ill at 9. Westchester offered no evidence of officers or directors not functioning. 
No evidence was offered of the use of the corporation as a facade for operations 
of the dominant shareholders. While we have counsel's assertions that Zimmermans 
were the dominant shareholders, there is no evidence of what interest in the corporation 
they owned nor is there evidence of how the corporation was used as a facade. The 
only evidence is that Paria conducted its research business in a proper corporate form. 
Finally, there is no evidence of the use of the corporate entity in promoting 
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injustice or fraud. Counsel asserts that this factor and the prior factor are evidenced by 
the sale of assets to PGM, Inc. The evidence concerning that sale does not in any way 
support Westchester's position. 
The only testimony regarding the sale of assets was that the assets were 
appraised by an independent appraiser then sold for their fair market value. Tr. I at 
176. At the time of the transfer Paria Group received a note in the amount of 
$600,000.00 and a security agreement. The note calls for payments of not less than 
$9,000.00 per month. Exhibit 90. By the time of trial approximately $500,000.00 had 
been paid on the note. Tr. I at 146-147. That evidence is uncontroverted. Westchester 
suggests that the trial court was justified in not believing that evidence despite the fact 
that there was not a single word of evidence to justify believing anything else. 
To support that position, Westchester suggests that Zimmerman contradicted 
himself. That suggestion is nonsense. Counsel argues that had "payments actually 
been made according to the promissory note, only $108,000 would have been paid up 
until the date of trial." In fact the $108,00 would have been a minimum and more than 
that minimum was paid. She also suggests that the fact that the shareholders wanted 
to be cashed out but that as of the time of trial none of the money had been distributed 
to shareholders is inconsistent. In fact, as of the time of trial the note hadn't been paid 
in full, some of Paria Groups liabilities were still in dispute as is evidenced by this 
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lawsuit, and it would have been premature and improper for Paria to have made a 
distribution to shareholders. There were no inconsistencies in Zimmerman's testimony 
on that point, it was uncontradicted by any other evidence, and the trial court had no 
basis for finding otherwise. 
Counsel also suggests that the sale for fair market value somehow violated the 
Fraudulent Transfer act and that there was an actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud 
creditors. It should be obvious that the transfer could in no way hinder creditors. 
Paria's financial position, having converted assets to cash, is exactly the same except 
for being more liquid. That could hardly hinder creditors. 
In summary, the evidence presented to the trial court established only one of the 
eight factors for piercing the corporate veil. The nonpayment of dividends is easily 
explained by the fact that the corporation was never sufficiently profitable to continue 
expansion while paying dividends. One factor out of eight is not sufficient to support 
the trial court's ruling. 
POINT II: THE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER PGM, INC. 
The cases relied upon by Westchester to assert the court had jurisdiction against 
PGM, Inc. are uniform in one respect: In each of those cases the party sought to be held 
had the opportunity to litigate the question as is clear form the quotes in Westchester's 
brief: " . . . unlike Hazeltine, Pierce has had a full and complete opportunity to litigate 
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the alter-ego question . . ." Mansfield v. Pierce. 153 F.3d 721, 728 (4th Cir. N.C. 
1988), "This case [Hazeltine] is clearly distinguishable from the case at hand, in which 
[the unnamed defendant]... had a full opportunity to defend itself." Performance Plus 
Fund. Ltd. v. Winfield & Co.. Inc.. 443 F.Supp. 1188, 1193 (U.S.D.C, N.D. Cal. 
1977). 
PGM, on the other hand, had no opportunity to litigate. Besides not being a 
party to the action, the trial court stated on the first day of trial tha t" . . . she'll never 
get a judgment against PGM,..." Tr. I at 178. Having that ruling from the court, and 
that being the law of the case, litigating that question and extabhshing the independence 
of PGM was not an issue that was addressed. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no substantial evidence in the record to support the piercing of the 
corporate veil. The trial court had no jurisdiction to enter judgment against PGM, Inc. 
The judgment of the trial court as to Zimmerman and PGM, Inc. should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _2C?day of July, 1999. 
.-••••-) / /• I / / 
John G. Mulliner 
Attorney for Appellant Zimmerman 
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